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I. INTRODUCTIONIN FEBRUARY of 1995, seven major U.S. airlines individually
announced decisions to cap travel agent commissions at
twenty-five dollars for one-way tickets and fifty dollars for round-
trip tickets. In response, the American Society of Travel Agents,
inter alia, filed a class action complaint against those airlines on
April 7, 1995, alleging that the airlines engaged in anti-competi-
tive behavior by conspiring to cap travel agent commissions.'
Thus, the plaintiffs claimed that the airlines violated sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act.2
The plaintiffs asserted that a commission cap would have
been economically detrimental to each airline had they acted
individually. If one or two of the airlines capped commissions,
the travel agents would have directed sales to other airlines,
causing the airlines that imposed a cap to suffer economic loss.
Therefore, the travel agents claimed the airlines must have con-
spired to ensure united action to achieve the greatest economic
benefit.
Each airline, on the other hand, maintained that it acted in-
dependently and denied all allegations of a conspiracy. Further-
more, the airlines asserted that the plaintiffs did not possess
enough evidence to reach a jury, much less to actually prove
that a conspiracy existed. Consequently, the airlines filed sev-
eral motions for summary judgment. Specifically, they claimed
that in antitrust conspiracy cases, when there is no direct evi-
dence of a conspiracy, the plaintiffs must meet a strict, and ar-
I Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 1-2, In re Travel Agency Comm's Antitrust
Litig., 898 F. Supp. 685 (D. Minn. 1995) (No. 4-95-107).
2 Id. at 15; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
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guably heightened, standard to defeat a defendant's motion for
summary judgment.
Under this "heightened" summary judgment standard, if a de-
fendant offers evidence of independent decision-making, the
plaintiffs are required to introduce evidence that tends to ex-
clude the possibility of such independent action. In response,
the plaintiffs maintained that according to the Supreme Court
in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,3 they need not
meet a heightened standard to defeat summary judgment in an-
titrust cases. A close look at the case law, however, reveals that
the standard necessary to defeat summary judgment is, at best,
unclear.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
summary judgment may be granted if it can be shown that there
is "no genuine issue as to any material fact."4 If this is shown,
the moving party will be entitled to 'Judgment as a matter of
law."' 5 The purpose of Rule 56 is to determine whether both
parties have enough evidence to justify the expense and burden
of a trial.6 The court, in In re Travel Agency Commission Antitrust
Litigation,7 denied the airlines' motions for summary judgment.
Basing its decision on the Rule 56 summary judgment standard,
the court held that the nonmoving party's inferences must only
be reasonable in order to reach a jury.' This discussion calls
into question the summary judgment standard in antitrust litiga-
tion, and highlights the potential confusion in determining
what evidence will defeat a defendant's motion for summary
judgment in the context of an antitrust conspiracy.case. 9
This Comment will discuss the summary judgment standard
in antitrust conspiracy cases in the context of the airline travel
3 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
5 Id.
6 RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
621 (6th ed. 1990).
7 In re Travel Agency Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 898 F. Supp. 685, 690 (D. Minn.
1995). Note that most of the court documents and evidence presented in sup-
port and defense of summary judgment was sealed by the court.
8 Id. at 690.
9 In re Travel was settled in 1996. The airlines agreed to pay the travel agents a
total of $86 million. The commission caps remain in place and have become a
reality that the travel agents must face. Therefore, whether the airlines actually
conspired will not be legally settled. Alan Fredericks, The Caps Settlement; Commis-
sion Caps, TRAVEL WKLY., Sept. 12, 1996, at 30; Jim Barlow, Airlines Win Travel
Agent War, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 8, 1996, at 1.
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agency litigation. This Comment will begin by addressing the
current state of the airline industry and the economic motiva-
tion for imposing a commission cap. The Comment will then
discuss the standard for summary judgment, analyzing past case
law and the arguments presented by both the airlines and the
travel agents in this regard. Based on recent case law, this Com-
ment will assert that courts do not have a clear standard by
which to determine whether to grant summary judgment in anti-
trust conspiracy cases. Nevertheless, the Comment will con-
clude that the "tends to exclude" language should apply in
certain circumstances.
II. THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY: UNDERSTANDING THE
SOURCE OF CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM
A. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Before the decision to cap commissions, U.S. airlines had suf-
fered economically since deregulation. From January 1978 to
December 1993, major U.S. airlines sustained cumulative net
losses of $9.3 billion.1" The airlines sustained gross losses of $2.6
billion in 1992 and $12.8 billion in 1993.11 U.S. airlines
"carr[ied] a debt burden of $35 billion, or more than eight
times the industry's total accumulated profit from the beginning
of commercial aviation in the 1920s, until 1988. '' 12 A solution to
this problem is not certain given the enormous costs associated
with airline operation. The industry faces great economic risks
due to high input costs, extremely cyclical demand and intense
competition.' 3 Because the airlines have little control over cycli-
cal demand and competition, they are only capable of reducing
input costs in an attempt to improve their economic situation.
One commentator suggests that high input costs are the pri-
mary reason for poor industry performance since deregula-
tion. 4 From 1978 to 1990, U.S. airlines' operating costs rose by
ninety-four percent, with equipment rentals and travel agent
commissions rising the most from 1980 to 1990."5 In fact, travel
agent commissions cost the airlines hundreds of millions of dol-




13 Id. at 20.
14 James C. Lanik, Note, Stopping the Tailspin: Use of Oligopolistic and Oligopsonis-




lars each year.16 Although the airlines achieved record profits
during the second quarter of 1995, Robert Crandall, Chairman
of AMR Corporation, the parent company of American Airlines,
expressed his concern for the airline industry shortly after the
announced commission caps.' 7 He suggested that carriers will
not be able to continue to maintain their recent profitability un-
less they are able to reduce costs."'
Therefore, reducing input costs may be essential to improving
the airlines' economic situation. The airline industry can be di-
vided into thirds based on a cost to profit ratio with the bottom
one-third representing low-cost carriers.1 9 The expenditures of
the low-cost portion are five percent lower than the high-cost
portion z.2  The reduction of labor costs, as well as travel agent
commission costs, could result in the high-cost airline carriers
entering the realm of low-cost carriers.2 1 Therefore, the issue
becomes how the airline industry can effectively reduce input
costs.
B. REDUCING INPUT COSTS: THE ARLINES' DECISION TO CAP
COMMISSIONS
On February 9, 1995, Delta Air Lines, Inc. sought to reduce its
input costs by keeping the commission rate at ten percent but
capping travel agent commissions at $25 per one-way ticket over
$250 and $50 per round-trip ticket over $500.22 By February 13,
1995, American, Northwest, United, USAir, Continental, and
TWA had announced similar commission caps.23 As a result, the
airlines succeeded in paying $40 million less in commissions be-
tween April and June of 1995 than they paid during the same
period in 1994.24 This translated into a loss of almost $1 million
16 Crandall Defends Commission Curb, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 9, 1995, at B2.
17 Id.
18 Terry Maxon, Crandall Defends Fee Cap: Travel Agents Paid Well, American
Chairman Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 9, 1995, at 3F.
19 Lanik, supra note 14, at 513.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Maxon, supra note 18, at 3F; Joint Memorandum of Law in Support of De-
fendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, In re Travel (No. 4-95-107).
23 Joint Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 10, In re Travel (No. 4-95-107).
24 Terry Maxon, Travel Agent Commission Caps Boost Airlines' Profits: Top 10 Save
$40 million in 2nd Quarter Commissions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 27, 1995, at
1H.
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per day to the travel agency industry.25 Consequently, the travel
agents asserted that the airlines conspired to cap commissions
and that this conspiracy caused the travel agency industry's
losses.
C. CONCERTED ACTION OR OLIGOPOLISTIC BEHAVIOR?
The airlines' decision to cap commissions was described as a
"bold first step towards utilizing the oligopsony power it wields
over an industry providing an essential factor input .... ,,26 In
fact, the airline industry is both an oligopoly and an oligopsony.
There are few actors in the industry, and as a result, the airlines
are capable of effecting prices in the market.
The airlines, as sellers, can effect the price at which consum-
ers buy, thus acting as an oligopoly. 27 Because there are few sell-
ers in the market, a price reduction that results in a substantial
output gain for one airline will result in a substantial contrac-
tion in the output of another. 28 This causes other airlines to re-
spond quickly and reduce prices in order to compete.29
Because there is a likelihood of quick reaction by competitors
within the market, an oligopolist will be less likely to engage in
significant price reductions. Oligopolists are thus "interdepen-
dent" in their pricing. 0 There is a tendency to avoid vigorous
price competition because actors base their pricing decisions in
part on anticipated reactions by other actors. 1 Therefore, par-
allel action by members of an oligopoly is arguably a function of
their economic situation, and not the result of concerted action
that violates section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Parallel action can also occur in an oligopsony. When the air-
lines as buyers can effect the price at which producers sell, an
oligopsony exists.32 By capping commissions, the airlines acted,
in effect, as an oligopsony by limiting the price at which travel
agents could charge for their services. If one assumes that, as
25 Jennifer Dorsey, judge Orders Trial by Jury in Caps Case, TRAVEL WKLY., Aug.
28, 1995, at 1.
26 Lanik, supra note 14, at 530.
27 Id. at 531.
28 Id.
29 Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REv. 1562, 1564 (1969).
30 F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
157 (1970).




rational, profit-maximizing members of an oligopsony, airlines
are interdependent, each airline would follow another airline's
decision to cap commissions to achieve reduced input costs.
Perhaps, then, the decision by all of the major airlines to limit
commission caps within such a short period of time is merely
the result of the interdependence that exists between the air-
lines as members of an oligopsony. 3 Accordingly, each airline
may have acted independently for its own benefit, although in
response to competitor airlines' decisions. 4
Although oligopolistic behavior is often a function of natural
market pressures, can this behavior constitute a violation of the
antitrust laws? In addressing this issue, it is important to con-
sider whether such "natural behavior" is actually a form of con-
certed action. In fact, "coordination of pricing policies to
maximize joint profits is not easy, especially when costs and mar-
ket share disparities engender conflicting price and output pref-
erences among industry members. '35 Therefore, the activities of
an oligopoly that facilitate coordination could amount to con-
certed action. These activities include: "free and rapid inter-
firm communication, repetitive transactions, [and] the culti-
vated expectation that price cuts will be promptly countered. 36
If a plaintiff challenges this activity, it must determine how to
survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment.
III. CHALLENGING THE OLIGOPOLISTIC BEHAVIOR OF
U.S. AIRLINES
A. ALLEGATIONS OF AN ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY
Following the announcement by the seven major airlines to
cap travel agent commissions on one-way and round-trip airline
tickets, the American Society of Travel Agents filed suit against
the airlines on its own behalf, as well as on the behalf of its
33 It is interesting to note that all airlines, before reducing commission caps,
paid the same commission of 10% per ticket. Maxon, supra note 18, at 3F. This
uniform commission level in the industry was never challenged. Perhaps the uni-
form rate exemplifies the interdependence that exists within an oligopoly/
oligopsony.
34 This economic discussion reveals the difficulty in determining whether the
airlines actually conspired to cap commissions. It is important to consider, how-
ever, that in order for the airlines to achieve a benefit from reducing commission
caps, each airline had to limit travel agent commissions. This limitation strength-
ens the plaintiffs' argument that each airline could not have capped commissions
without first ensuring that its competitors would follow.
35 SCHERER, supra note 30, at 157.
36 Id.
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members, 37 alleging violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act.38 The plaintiffs claimed that the airlines engaged in a
"continuing combination and conspiracy to restrain competi-
tion among themselves," which consisted of a "common under-
standing and concerted course of conduct. '39 The plaintiffs'
complaint heavily relied on the immediate response to Delta's
initial commission cap announcement. Less than twenty-four
hours after Delta made its decision public, American Airlines
announced its plan to cap commissions. 40 The plaintiffs as-
serted that Northwest issued a press release only minutes after
the American announcement. 4' The remaining defendant air-
lines followed suit within days of these initial decisions.42
The plaintiffs further alleged that market forces would have
defeated independent action on the part of an airline to cap
travel agent commissions.43 The complaint asserted that with-
outjoint action, a decision to "cut sharply travel agents' commis-
sions" would have given travel agents a strong incentive to direct
customers to airlines that paid full commissions.44 Therefore,
the plaintiffs claimed that the airlines must have conspired to
lower the compensation paid to travel agents. As a result of this
conspiracy, the long-standing travel agent commission rate of
ten percent was replaced by caps that according to the plaintiffs
were artificial and contrary to normal marketing practices.
37 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 1, In re Travel (No. 4-95-107).
3s Id. at 25-28. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract, com-
bination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act says that "[e]very person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or per-
sons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... .. 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1994).
39 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 25, In re Travel (No. 4-95-107).
40 Id. at 22.
41 Id.
42 Id. It is important to note that Trans World Airlines also capped commis-
sions, but was not a part of this lawsuit at the summaryjudgment stage because it
settled with the plaintiffs in the case. The court granted final approval of the
settlement on August 16, 1995. In re Travel, 898 F. Supp. at 687 n.3.
43 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 20, In re Travel (No. 4-95-107).
44 Id.
1162
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B. PROVING A CONSPIRACY: THE USE OF INDIRECT AND
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
In order to support a claim of conspiracy in violation of the
Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff is not
required to provide direct evidence. For example, in Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States," the Supreme Court held that plain-
tiffs may establish a conspiracy with indirect or circumstantial
evidence provided that the evidence creates an inference of
agreement among the defendants. 46 Because "no formal agree-
ment is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy,""7 courts
recognize the difficulty in presenting direct evidence of a con-
spiratorial agreement among competitors. Therefore, indirect
evidence of business behavior is admissible circumstantial evi-
dence from which an agreement may be inferred."8
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also concluded that be-
cause of the nature of conspiracy cases, direct evidence is not
required. In ES Development, Inc. v. RWM Enterprises, Inc.,"9 the
Eighth Circuit held that indirect evidence may establish a con-
spiracy in violation of the Sherman Act. In ES Development, the
plaintiff, a real estate developer, alleged that various automobile
dealers conspired to prevent automobile manufacturers from
granting franchises to competitors in a proposed auto mall. The
court, in addressing the evidentiary requirements, acknowl-
edged that in order to establish an antitrust violation, a plaintiff
45 306 U.S. 208 (1939). In this case, two movie theater chains sent eight film
distributors identical letters, demanding that the distributors cease to supply first-
run films to exhibitors who did not meet a schedule of minimum prices or who
showed these films as part of a double feature. Although there was no direct
evidence of a conspiracy, "[i]t taxe[d] credulity" to believe that the distributors
would have independently adopted "such far reaching changes in their business
methods without some understanding that all were to join .... . Id. at 223.
Interestingly, the market was oligopolistic in nature and, consequently, each dis-
tributor was aware of the practices of its major competitors.
46 Id. at 221, 225. The Court was influenced by the defendants' failure to call
as witnesses the corporate officers who were in a position to know whether their
company had acted pursuant to an agreement. Once the plaintiffs indirect evi-
dence created an inference of concerted action, the Court shifted the burden of
proof to the defendants to provide affirmative proof of independent action. See
also FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 393, 401 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
47 Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Mem'l Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700,
704 (1969) (quoting American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 809).
48 Id. (citing Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 540 (1954)).
49 939 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1097 (1992).
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must prove the existence of a contract, combination, or conspir-
acy among the defendants.5 ° The evidence must also show that
the defendants conspired to "achieve an unlawful objective."'"
The difficulty does not lie in providing evidence of concerted
action, but rather in establishing that the defendants acted to
achieve an unlawful end. The court stated that "it is axiomatic
that the typical conspiracy is 'rarely evidenced by explicit agree-
ments,' but in typical cases must be proved by 'inferences that
may be drawn from the behavior of the alleged conspirators."'52
Because of this difficulty, indirect evidence may be essential in
proving a conspiracy in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act.
Although a plaintiff may present indirect evidence to prove an
alleged antitrust violation, "[a] ntitrust law ... limits the range of
inferences that may be drawn from circumstantial evidence to
prove an unlawful conspiracy."5 Conduct that is as consistent
with lawful activity as with an illegal conspiracy will not, by itself,
prove a violation of antitrust laws.54 If a defendant can establish
a pro-competitive explanation for its actions, circumstantial evi-
dence may not create an inference of a conspiracy. 55
C. CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM AND OLIGOPOLISTIC BEHAVIOR AS
INDIRECT EVIDENCE OF A CONSPIRACY
Evidence of conscious parallelism is often introduced by
plaintiffs in antitrust conspiracy cases as proof of concerted par-
allel action. Conscious parallelism or tacit collusion is a process
by which firms in a concentrated market recognize their price
and output interdependence by implicitly sharing their monop-
oly power and setting prices at a profit-maximizing, supracom-
petitive level." As previously discussed, this behavior is typical
50 Id. at 553 (citing International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines,
Inc., 623 F.2d 1255, 1265 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980)).
51 Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764
(1984)).
52 Id. (quoting H.L. Moore Drug Exch. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 662 F.2d 935, 941 (2d
Cir. 1981)).
53 Seagood Trading Corp. v.Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 1574 (11th Cir. 1991)
(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986)).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226
(1993). See also Barry v. Blue Cross, 805 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1986) (reasoning
that if a plaintiff alleges a horizontal agreement to fix prices involving conscious
parallelism, "[e] conomic interdependence exists only if an industry has relatively
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in an oligopoly.5 7 In order to prove conscious parallelism that
amounts to a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act,58 the
evidence must show that "each participant knew that concerted
action was contemplated and invited, gave its adherence to and
participated in the scheme, and understood that cooperation
was essential to the plan.
59
Evidence of conscious parallelism alone is not enough to
prove a conspiracy unless the additional factors, such as knowl-
edge of the scheme and a willingness to participate, are present.
In addition, if the plaintiff presents a theory of conscious paral-
lelism to prove a conspiracy, the plaintiff must show that the
"defendants engaged in consciously parallel action ...which
was contrary to . ..good faith business judgment." " Accord-
ingly, if the defendants succeed in asserting an independent
business justification for their action, the allegation of conspir-
acy will fail.61 Therefore, parallel action, even if conscious on
the part of the defendants, does not establish a violation of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.62 Conscious parallelism is "not in
itself unlawful. 63
Arguably, the decision to cap commissions involved a compli-
cated analysis of business considerations, including the reduc-
tion of input costs. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in
Houser v. Fox Theatres Management Corp.64 that where the defend-
ant's challenged decisions were based on a complicated estima-
few competitors so that the actions of each has some impact on market price and
thus on the conduct of competitors.").
57 See supra text accompanying notes 27-35.
58 Note that most claims are actually pursued under section 1 of the Sherman
Act because of the difficulty of establishing a section 2 violation.
59 City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co., 872 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988),
amended on denial of rehg, 886 F.2d 246 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1076 (1990).
6o Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 559 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981).
61 Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1361
(10th Cir. 1989).
62 Theatre Enter. Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541
(1954).
63 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 227 (1993). In Brooke Group, a cigarette manufac-
turer brought an antitrust action against a competitor, alleging a violation of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
engaged in a predatory pricing scheme. Although this case did not involve an
alleged section 1 antitrust conspiracy claim, the Supreme Court's discussion of
conscious parallelism is important to consider in this context.
- 845 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1988).
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tion of potential costs and benefits, the defendant's actions fell
within its broad discretion to make business decisions.65
The previous discussion presents important issues in deter-
mining the summary judgment standard in antitrust conspiracy
cases. If the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence of a con-
spiracy, is there a heightened standard to defeat a defendant's
motion for summary judgment? The following discussion con-
siders the summary judgment standard in general and then de-
termines how courts interpret this standard in antitrust
conspiracy cases. Specifically, this Comment considers the argu-
ments for and against summary judgment in the travel agency
litigation and whether the court applied the proper standard in
denying summary judgment.
IV. DEFEATING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY




The airlines, in an attempt to avoid costly and what they be-
lieved to be unnecessary litigation, moved for summary judg-
ment, claiming that there was not sufficient evidence before the
court to warrant a trial on the merits.66 The court, however, de-
nied the motion for summary judgment on August 23, 1995.67
The arguments, both in support of and in opposition to the mo-
tion for summary judgment, as well as the court's order, raise
important questions regarding the current standard for sum-
mary judgment in antitrust conspiracy cases.
A. THE STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT GENERALLY
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes
when a court may grant summary judgment in favor of the mov-
ing party prior to trial. If, on the basis of depositions, affidavits,
and other materials, it can be shown that "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact," the moving party will be entitled to
judgement as a matter of law.6" The advisory committee notes
65 Id. at 1232.
66 See American Airlines' Notice of and Motion for Summary Judgment, In re
Travel Agency Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 898 F. Supp. 685 (D. Minn. 1995) (No. 4-
95-107).
67 In re Travel, 898 F. Supp. at 691.
68 FED. R. Cv. P. 56(c).
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to Rule 56 state that the purpose of the summary judgment pro-
cedure "is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in or-
der to see whether there is a genuine need for trial."69
The Supreme Court established the standard for a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.70 If a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,
summary judgment should not be granted.7' Courts will not
make findings of fact, but will look for a genuine issue of fact
that warrants a trial. The moving party is not required to intro-
duce evidence that negates the nonmoving party's allegations,
but must establish an absence of evidence supporting an essen-
tial element of the claim.72 Consequently, summary judgment is
proper "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial. 73
Furthermore, in determining whether to grant summary judg-
ment, "the non-moving party is always entitled to the benefit of
all favorable inferences and that all genuine issues of fact must
be resolved by ajury.' '74 All reasonable questions as to the exist-
ence of alleged facts should be resolved in favor of the nonmov-
ing party. 75 The nonmoving party, however, must introduce
evidence showing there is a genuine issue for trial.76 In other
- FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) advisory committee's note.
70 477 U.S. 317 (1986). In Celotex, the plaintiff alleged that her husband died
as a result of exposure to products containing asbestos which were manufactured
or distributed by the defendants. The plaintiff alleged negligence, breach of war-
ranty and strict liability. Although the district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendant, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court, in
reversing the Court of Appeals' decision, stated that the "[s]ummary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but
rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."' Id. at
327 (quoting FED. R. Ctv. P. 1).
71 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
72 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
73 Id. at 322.
74 In re Workers' Compensation Ins. Antitrust Litig., 867 F.2d 1552, 1560 (8th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989).
75 Impossible Elec. Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protective Sys., 669 F.2d
1026, 1031 (5th Cir. 1982).
76 FED. R. Cv. P. 56(e). Rule 56(e) defines the burden on the nonmoving
party, stating that:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the ad-
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words, the court considers the entire record, not just the allega-
tions or denials made in the pleadings, in determining whether
to grant a summary judgment motion.7 The opposing party's
inferences do not need to be more probable than those of the
moving party, but they must be able to be reasonably inferred
from the facts. 71 In the final determination, the judge must con-
sider whether "there is reason to believe that the better course
would be to proceed to a full trial. '79 Summaryjudgment "is not
to be granted unless the movant has established his right to a
judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy
and that the other party is not entitled to recover under any
discernible circumstances."80 Therefore, the moving party must
make a strong showing that there is no genuine issue to be re-
solved by a jury trial.
B. THE INITIAL DEBATE: Is SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPROPRIATE
IN ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY CASES?
Before Celotex, courts were reluctant to grant summary judg-
ment in antitrust litigation. This hesitancy was exemplified by
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.8" In Poller, CBS had a
network agreement with the plaintiff, a Milwaukee UHF station.
CBS, however, anticipated an amendment to the Federal Com-
munications Commission's multiple ownership rules, which
would allow CBS to purchase UHF stations. Therefore, CBS ac-
quired an option to purchase another UHF station. Once the
amendment took effect, CBS exercised the option and subse-
quently terminated its contract with the plaintiff. Accordingly,
verse party'n response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
Id.
77 Austin Prods. Co. v. Workers' Compensation Insurers' Rating Assoc., 867
F.2d 1552, 1560 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989).
78 WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Southway Thea-
tres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 495 (5th Cir. 1982)).
79 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249
(1948)).
80 Penne v. Greater Minneapolis Area Bd. of Realtors, 604 F.2d 1143, 1148 (8th
Cir. 1979) (citing Unlaub Co. v. Sexton, 568 F.2d 72, 76 (8th Cir. 1977); Robert
Johnson Grain Co. v. Chemical Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 209-10 (8th Cir.
1976)).
81 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
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the plaintiff alleged that the defendant conspired to eliminate
the plaintiff from the broadcast field in Milwaukee.82
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme
Court, however, criticized the decision to grant summary judg-
ment in the case given the complex nature of antitrust litigation.
The Supreme Court stated:
We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in
complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading
roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspira-
tors, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when the
witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that their
credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be ap-
praised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which so
long has been the hallmark of "even handed justice." 3
Therefore, the Court found that there was a genuine issue of
material fact to be addressed by a jury. 4
The Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed its position that
summary judgment should be granted sparingly in antitrust
cases. In Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens,
Inc.,"5 the Court reversed a decision to grant summary judg-
ment, although the plaintiffs had not introduced direct evi-
dence of concerted action on the part of the defendants. 8 6 The
plaintiff, a retailer of burial monuments and bronze grave mark-
ers, claimed that the defendants conspired to monopolize the
manufacture and sale of bronze grave markers, thus violating
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.8 7 Specifically, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendants engaged in various activities aimed
at decreasing the plaintiff's sales. Nevertheless, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.8 8
The Supreme Court, in reviewing the case, noted the circum-
stantial evidence that had been presented, including: (1) all of
the memorial parks refused the installation of the plaintiff's
markers; (2) the plaintiff was required to pay a fee for installing
its markers, while other lot owners were not required to pay
such a fee; (3) one of the defendants visited many of the memo-
82 Id. at 466.
83 Id. at 473 (citation omitted).
84 Id. at 467.
85 394 U.S. 700 (1969).
86 Id. at 704.
87 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994).
88 Norfolk, 394 U.S. at 701.
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rial parks on numerous occasions; and (4) one of the defend-
ant's pamphlets on cemeteries suggested practices which had
the effect of erecting competitive barriers to retailers other than
the cemeteries themselves.8 9 The plaintiff challenged the busi-
ness justifications offered by the defendants for these actions.
The Supreme Court found that this circumstantial evidence al-
lowed an inference of conspiracy.1 Citing Poller's words of cau-
tion that summary judgment should be used sparingly in
antitrust cases, the Court held that summary judgment in the
defendants' favor was improper.9 1
Both Poller and Norfolk highlight the Supreme Court's early
concern regarding summary judgment in antitrust cases. The
Supreme Court placed a high burden on the moving party to
establish that the evidence did not give rise to an inference of
conspiracy. As a result, many courts simply did not grant sum-
mary judgment in antitrust cases. Courts were generally con-
cerned that a trial on the merits was the only way to achieve a
proper result given that conspiracy cases focus on the state of
mind of the defendants. Therefore, because antitrust cases
often involve the establishment of intent and motive in a com-
plex factual context, summary judgment was granted only in ex-
treme situations.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld summary judgment
in First National Bank v. Cities Service Co.9 2 The plaintiffs alleged
that seven oil companies maintained an oil cartel and conspired
to boycott Iranian oil in all markets.93 In 1951, Iran nationalized
properties held by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 4 The defendants
allegedly hoped to boycott Iranian oil until Iran returned the
Anglo-Iranian property rights. 95
Before the nationalization of Anglo-Iranian property, the
plaintiff obtained a contract with the National Iranian Oil Com-
89 Id. at 701-02.
90 Id. at 703.
91 Id. at 704. Norfolk reaffirmed the probative significance of conscious paral-
lelism, giving great weight to parallel action in conspiracy cases. 1 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCI-
PLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 59 (1978). This Comment suggests that although
conscious parallelism may have probative value when combined with other facts,
mere conscious parallelism alone does not defeat a defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment.
92 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
93 Id. at 259-61.




pany (NIOC) in which NIOC would sell fifteen million metric
tons of crude oil to plaintiff and some of his associates.96 The
plaintiff claimed that the defendants conspired to prevent him
from selling any oil obtained under the contract with NIOC.
Furthermore, Cities Service allegedly broke off negotiations with
the plaintiff and joined the conspiracy after receiving an offer to
buy crude oil from Kuwait at an even lower price than the plain-
tiff could offer. This conspiracy allegedly undercut the plaintiffs
ability to sell oil under his contract with NIOC.97
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff failed to introduce
evidence creating an inference of a conspiracy on the part of
Cities Service.98 The Court found that Cities Service's business
decision to cease negotiations with the plaintiff was an in-
dependent business judgment and not an action in furtherance
of an illegal conspiracy.99 Furthermore, the evidence estab-
lished that entering into a contract with plaintiff would have
produced negative consequences for Cities Service. °° The
Court stated, "not only is the inference that Cities' failure to
deal was the product of factors other than conspiracy at least
equal to the inference that it was due to conspiracy, thus negat-
ing the probative force of the evidence showing such a failure,
but the former inference is more probable."' 1 If the probative
evidence establishes an inference of independent business mo-
tive that is more probable than the inference of concerted ac-
tion, summary judgment may be granted.10 2
Cities Service is one of the first examples of the Supreme
Court's willingness to grant summary judgment in antitrust con-
spiracy cases. Furthermore, even though Poller and Norfolk dis-
couraged summary judgment in antitrust cases, lower federal
96 Id.
97 Id. at 260-61.
98 Id. at 288.
- Id. at 277.
100 Id. at 280.
10, Id. After nationalization, the possessed company announced its intention
to sue any purchaser of Iranian oil. Therefore, oil purchasers, such as Cities Ser-
vice, refused to purchase Iranian oil. The Court found this explanation of Cities'
conduct more plausible than plaintiff's theory of a boycott directed against him.
Id. at 278.
102 Courts typically state that ambiguity from competing inferences should be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323. In Cities Service, however, the plaintiff was required to overcome the ambigu-
ity of the evidence, even though the court should have resolved the ambiguity in
the plaintiff's favor.
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courts are beginning to follow a different trend1 3 by granting
summary judgment in certain antitrust cases. 0 4 Recent case law
suggests that the Supreme Court is also shifting from its previ-
ous reluctance to grant summary judgment in antitrust litiga-
tion. ' Although the standard is not clearly defined and the
burden of proof may depend on the evidence presented by the
plaintiff to prove conspiracy, a plaintiff can no longer assume
that summary judgment will be used sparingly.
Must a plaintiff meet a stricter or "heightened" standard to
defeat summary judgment in antitrust conspiracy cases? Some
courts insist that there is not a heightened standard for sum-
mary judgment in complex antitrust cases. On the other hand,
if the nonmoving party is relying solely on indirect, circumstan-
tial evidence of a conspiracy, it may be required to meet an ar-
guably stricter standard in antitrust litigation in order to defeat
a motion for summary judgment. A nonmoving party may be
required to offer evidence that tends to exclude the possibility
that the moving parties acted independently.
103 For example, in Lamb's Patio Theatre, Inc. v. Universal Film Exchange
Inc., 582 F.2d 1068, 1069 (7th Cir. 1978), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision to grant summary judgment against the plaintiff. A theater
brought suit challenging a motion picture distributor's rejection of the theater's
bid for a film. The district court found that the distributor had legitimate busi-
ness considerations for rejecting the plaintiff's offer, noting that the plaintiff
failed to introduce evidence that countered the defendant's explanation of in-
dependent action. Therefore, the plaintiff was required to introduce more than
a departure from competitive bidding as evidence of a conspiracy, and because
the plaintiff did not, the district court granted summaryjudgment. Independent
business justifications outweighed an inference of concerted action. Id. at 1070.
104 See, e.g., Midwest Radio Co. v. Forum Publ'g Co., 942 F.2d 1294, 1296 (8th
Cir. 1991); see also Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979). In Lupia, the Seventh Circuit recognized
the potential importance of allowing summaryjudgment in antitrust conspiracy
cases. It stated:
[T] he very nature of antitrust litigation would encourage summary
disposition of such cases when permissible. Not only do antitrust
trials often encompass a great deal of expensive and time consum-
ing discovery and trial work, but also ... the statutory private anti-
trust remedy of treble damages affords a special temptation for the
institution of vexatious litigation .... The ultimate determination,
after trial, that an antitrust claim is unfounded, may come too late
to guard against the evils that occur along the way.
Lupia, 586 F.2d at 1167.
105 See infra notes 106-153 and accompanying text.
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C. THE ARGUMENT FOR A STRICTER STANDARD TO DEFEAT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1. Defining the Standard
In their motions for summary judgment, the airlines argued
that if the plaintiffs were relying on circumstantial evidence to
prove a conspiracy, and they were, then the plaintiffs were re-
quired to meet a stricter standard of proof to defeat the mo-
tion.1 °6  In support of this argument, the airlines cited
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,1°7 in which
the Supreme Court held that, in certain situations, evidence
used to defeat a summary judgment motion must tend to ex-
clude the possibility that the defendants acted independently.
The Court stated:
[c] onduct as consistent with permissible competition as with ille-
gal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of
antitrust conspiracy .... To survive a motion for summary judg-
ment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a
violation of § 1 must present evidence "that tends to exclude the
possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted independently.
[The nonmoving parties] in this case, in other words, must show
that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the com-
peting inferences of independent action or collusive action that
could not have harmed [the nonmoving parties].108
Accordingly, the airlines asserted that the travel agents, in rely-
ing on circumstantial evidence, were required to introduce evi-
dence that tended to exclude the possibility that the airlines did
not act independently in capping travel agent commissions. 10 9
In Matsushita, the plaintiffs, Zenith and National Union Elec-
tric, claimed that Japanese television manufacturers conspired
to raise and maintain artificially high prices for television receiv-
ers sold by the plaintiffs in Japan, and conversely, set low prices
for television receivers exported and sold in the United States.
This conspiracy allegedly resulted in substantial losses for the
plaintiffs. The district court granted the defendant's motion for
106 Joint Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 4, In re Travel (No. 4-95-107).
107 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
108 Id. at 588 (citations omitted) (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv., 465
U.S. 752, 764 (1984); First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 280
(1968)).
10 Defendants' Joint Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 4, In
re Travel (No. 4-95-107).
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summary judgment."" The court found that "the evidence that
bore directly on the alleged price-cutting conspiracy did not re-
but the more plausible inference that petitioners were cutting
prices to compete in the American market and not to monopo-
lize it.""'
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's decision, first ruling that much of the excluded evidence
was actually admissible." 2 This evidence established a possible
inference of conspiracy and as a result, summary judgment was
improper in the case."' The Third Circuit recognized, how-
ever, that "there are legal limitations upon the inferences which
may be drawn from circumstantial evidence .... 114
The Supreme Court, in review of this decision, found that
predatory pricing schemes, such as the one alleged, usually
harm those who enter into them.'1 5 The Court observed, "any
agreement to price below the competitive level requires the con-
spirators to forgo profits that free competition would offer
them."' 6 After an extensive economic analysis of predatory
pricing, the Court held that "the absence of any plausible mo-
tive to engage in the conduct charged is highly relevant to
whether a 'genuine issue for trial' exists within the meaning of
Rule 56(e)." '117
In defining a summary judgment standard, the Court sug-
gested that "if the factual context renders respondents' claim
implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes no economic
sense-respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence
to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary."11  This
statement suggests that the Court could require a stricter stan-
dard of proof to defeat summary judgment in certain antitrust
conspiracy cases, as the airlines suggested in their motion for
summary judgment. The pivotal factor in Matsushita, however,
was the lack of a plausible economic motive for the defendants
to engage in a conspiracy. The Court did not discuss whether a
I1'l Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 579. It is important to note that the district court
ruled that a majority of the plaintiff's evidence was inadmissible. Id. at 578.
111 Id. at 579.
i11 ld. at 580.
113 Id.
114 Id. (quoting In reJapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 304
(3d Cir. 1983)).
115 Id. at 589.
116 Id. at 588.
"7 Id. at 596.
118 Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
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heightened standard would apply if circumstantial evidence sup-
ported both a conspiracy and independent action. In dictum,
however, the Court indicated that the plaintiffs may be required
to meet a strict standard even if they have advanced a plausible
economic motive to conspire on the part of the defendants.
The Court stated:
We do not imply that, if petitioners had had a plausible reason to
conspire, ambiguous conduct could suffice to create a triable is-
sue of conspiracy. Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Ser-
vice Corp .... establishes that conduct that is as consistent with
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, with-
out more, support even an inference of conspiracy.' 19
Although this was not the case in Matsushita, the Court sug-
gested that even if a conspiracy is economically plausible, the
nonmoving party may be required to meet a stricter standard if
the evidence is ambiguous.
The Court in Matsushita applied the standard to defeat a di-
rected verdict established in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp.120 In Monsanto, Spray-Rite, a distributor of Monsanto
chemical products, claimed that Monsanto and several of its dis-
tributors conspired to fix the resale prices of Monsanto prod-
ucts. As a result of this alleged conspiracy, Spray-Rite claimed
that it was unable to purchase Monsanto's products. Further-
more, Spray-Rite claimed that Monsanto canceled its distributor-
ship and encouraged distributors to boycott Spray-Rite in
furtherance of the conspiracy.121 The jury found that Monsanto
had conspired with one or more of its distributors to set resale
prices and to limit Spray-Rite's access to Monsanto herbicides.
Additionally, the jury found that Monsanto adopted compensa-
tion programs and shipping policies in furtherance of this
conspiracy. 122
The Supreme Court upheld the jury's decision. 21 In order to
create a jury issue:
there must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of
independent action by the manufacturer and distributor. That
is, there must be direct or circumstantial evidence that reason-
ably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others had a con-
119 Id. at 597 n.21 (citation omitted).
120 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
121 Id. at 757.
122 Id. at 757-58.
123 Id. at 759.
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scious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an
unlawful objective.124
Therefore, the evidence must tend to exclude independent de-
cision-making in order to defeat a directed verdict.
Following this decision, the Matsushita Court required the
plaintiff to present evidence that tended to exclude the possibil-
ity that the defendant acted independently to defeat the motion
for summary judgment. When does the Matsushita-Monsanto
standard apply? Although the airlines asserted that Matsushita
creates a stricter standard to defeat a summary judgment mo-
tion, the Matsushita Court did not clearly address this issue.
Therefore, it is unclear when a plaintiff must introduce evidence
that tends to exclude the possibility that the plaintiffs acted
independently.
Other courts have relied on the Matsushita decision as support
for summary judgment in antitrust cases. In Key Financial Plan-
ning Corp. v. ITT Life Insurance Corp.,1 25 the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld summary judgment, reformulating the sum-
mary judgment standard in Matsushita as a two-part test. Plain-
tiff Key alleged that its termination as an agent for ITT was the
result of a conspiracy to drive Key out of business. First, the
court asked whether the plaintiffs evidence of a conspiracy was
as consistent with the defendant's permissible independent in-
terests as with an illegal conspiracy, and therefore ambiguous.
Second, if the evidence was ambiguous, the court required that
the plaintiffs introduce evidence that tended to exclude the pos-
sibility that the defendants were pursuing independent
interests. 126
124 Id. at 768. See Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 1573
(11th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he mere opportunity to conspire among antitrust defend-
ants does not, standing alone, permit the inference of conspiracy.") (citing Bolt
v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 827 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
924 (1990)). See also Helicopter Support Sys. v. Hughes Helicopter Inc., 818 F.2d
1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1987) (in order to defeat a properly supported motion for
summary judgment, a plaintiff must present evidence that tends to exclude the
possibility that the defendants acted independently).
125 828 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1987).
126 Id. at 640 (citing Gibson v. Greater Park City Co., 818 F.2d 722, 724 (10th
Cir. 1987)). In Gibson, a developer brought an antitrust claim against the city and
one of the developer's competitors claiming that they had acted with conspirato-
rial motive in placing various restrictions on the developer's condominium and
shopping mall projects. The court held that "[a]ll of the evidence presented by
the plaintiffs is ambiguous: it can support either a permissible or a conspiratorial
motive. There is no evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the de-
fendants were pursuing independent interests." Gibson, 818 F.2d at 725.
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Key introduced evidence of meetings and conversations about
itself, plans to open new offices in their home city more than a
month before the company's termination and evidence of in-
centives given to Key's agents to transfer to one of the defend-
ant's agencies. The defendant, however, asserted that it
terminated Key's contract because of inadequate production.
The court found that the evidence introduced by the defend-
ants supported this justification.1 27 Therefore, it held that it was
possible that the defendants were acting independently. 2 As a
result, the evidence was ambiguous.
The court then discussed whether there was evidence that
tended to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted inde-
pendently. According to the court's holding, ambiguous evi-
dence alone does not exclude the possibility of independent
action. 129 Therefore, "the independent plausible explanations
for the defendants' conduct bring this case within the Matsushita
test for awarding summary judgment in a case alleging a con-
spiracy to violate the antitrust laws."' 3 ° As a result, the court
granted summary judgment.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also applied the Matsu-
shita summary judgment standard in an antitrust conspiracy
case. In Market Force Inc. v. Wauwatosa Realty Co.,' the plaintiffs
were required to introduce evidence that tended to exclude the
possibility that the defendants acted for their own independent
interests to defeat summary judgment. 3 2 The plaintiff, a real
estate broker who represented buyers, alleged that the defend-
ants real estate agencies violated antitrust laws by conspiring to
pay the buyer's broker less than the listing broker's commis-
sions. The court, in applying the Matsushita standard, stated:
In antitrust cases, the analysis.., permits a defendant to rebut an
allegation of conspiracy by showing a plausible and justifiable
reason for its conduct that is consistent with proper business
practice. Once the defendant has met this initial burden, a plain-
tiff must provide specific factual support for its allegations of con-
127 Key, 828 F.2d at 639.
128 Id. at 640.
129 Id.
130 Id. (quoting Gibson, 818 F.2d at 725).
131 906 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1990).
132 Id. at 1170-71 (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 768).
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spiracy tending to show that the defendant was not acting
independently.133
Thus, the court suggested the application of a stricter stan-
dard. The evidence presented by the plaintiffs supported both
the existence of a conspiracy and the existence of independent
action on the part of the defendants.13 4 Nonetheless, the plain-
tiff argued that the defendants conspired through a series of in-
formal communications about the intended future policy to pay
a lower commission to buyer's brokers and that the defendants
also made various hostile statements about the plaintiff, indicat-
ing a desire to conspire against it. The court noted, however,
that the defendants introduced legitimate business reasons for
the actions that the plaintiff suggested were part of an illegal
conspiracy. 135 Because the court determined that the evidence
in the case was ambiguous, it stated, "the plaintiff may survive
summary judgment only by putting forth 'evidence that tends to
exclude the possibility that the defendants were pursuing . . .
independent interests.'
1 36
Market Force, therefore, supports the airlines' position that a
plaintiff in an antitrust case must meet a stricter standard to de-
feat a motion for summary judgment. The court concluded:
The teaching of Monsanto and Matsushita is that, in order to sur-
vive a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff must put forward
evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent ac-
tion. A defendant is entitled to summary judgment when it "pro-
vides a plausible and justifiable alternative interpretation of its
conduct that rebuts the alleged conspiracy.
1 37
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in City of Long Beach v.
Standard Oil Co., 33 reaffirmed the position that a defendant may
be entitled to summary judgment if the defendant offers evi-
dence of a justifiable independent business motivation. If only
indirect, circumstantial evidence is presented in an antitrust
133 Id. at 1171 (quoting Richards v. Neilsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902
(9th Cir. 1987)).
134 Id. at 1173.
135 Id. The defendants reasoned that communication about their intention to
pay a lower commission to buyer's brokers was a normal way to inform brokers of
their changes in policies and that these policies were decided upon based on the
different services that buyer's brokers provide in comparison to listing brokers.
136 Id. (quoting Gibson, 818 F.2d at 724) (alteration in original).
137 Id. at 1174 (quoting City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co., 872 F.2d 1401,
1406 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub. nom. Exxon Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 493
U.S. 1076 (1990)).
138 872 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1989).
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conspiracy case, then "a defendant is entitled to summary judg-
ment if it provides a plausible and justifiable alternative inter-
pretation of its conduct that rebuts the alleged conspiracy. 139
The City of Long Beach sued several oil companies claiming
that they conspired to fix and maintain uniform, noncompeti-
tive prices for crude oil which was produced by one of the city's
oil fields.
Although the defendants introduced evidence in support of
the assertion that their actions were lawful and motivated by le-
gitimate business concerns, the plaintiffs asserted that market
conditions should have caused the defendants to raise crude oil
prices. The court held that the plaintiffs "presented significant
evidence of an antitrust conspiracy that tends to exclude the
possibility of independent action."140
It is this standard that the airlines assert should have been
applied in the travel agency litigation. The previous discussion
suggests that if the plaintiffs are relying solely on circumstantial
evidence that supports both a conspiracy and independent ac-
tion, the plaintiffs must introduce evidence that tends to ex-
clude the possibility that the defendants acted independently.
2. Conscious Parallelism and a Heightened Standard
Evidence of conscious parallelism is not enough to prove a
conspiracy.141 But will evidence of conscious parallelism defeat
a defendant's motion for summary judgment? In determining
whether to grant summary judgment, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware
Co., 14 2 held that "a plaintiff cannot withstand a summary judg-
ment motion by establishing only consciously parallel behavior
on the part of the defendants. ' 143 The plaintiffs were required
to introduce evidence that tended to exclude the possibility that
the defendants acted independently.1 44 To meet this standard
in a conscious parallelism case, "a plaintiff also must demon-
strate the existence of certain 'plus' factors, for only when these
139 Id. (citing T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d
626, 632 (9th Cir. 1987)).
140 Id. at 1407.
141 See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
142 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Moyer Packing Co. v. Pe-
truzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc., 510 U.S. 994 (1993).
143 Id. at 1232.
144 Id.
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additional factors are present does the evidence tend to exclude
the possibility that the defendants acted independently.' '1
45
What plus factors will tend to exclude the possibility that the
defendants acted independently? The court in Petruzzi's IGA ex-
plained that a plaintiff could establish plus factors by introduc-
ing: "(1) actions contrary to the defendant's economic
interests, and (2) a motivation to enter into such an agree-
ment. ''146 Thus, the circumstantial evidence must create an in-
ference of concerted action. Mere conscious parallelism is not
enough. 147
In the travel agency litigation, the airlines claimed that their
actions prior to the commissions cap announcement did not
amount to a conspiracy and that the plaintiffs introduced only
evidence of conscious parallelism which, standing alone, does
not establish an antitrust violation. 141 Instead, the airlines main-
tained that they acted for their own economic benefit. 149 Fur-
thermore, the airlines denied that any of their actions before
the announcement to cap commissions constituted plus factors
that would defeat a motion for summary judgment.15 ° The air-
lines asserted that Delta never made any public statements to
145 Id.
146 Id. See also WILLIAM C. HOLMES, 1992 ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 1.03[3],
at 154 (noting that a wide range of circumstantial evidence can be used to estab-
lish the required plus factors).
For example, have they attended meetings or conducted discus-
sions at which they had the opportunity to conspire; have they ac-
ted against their own economic best interests; have they engaged in
parallel behavior that is economically irrational unless an agree-
ment exists; has at least one participant expressly invited common
action by the others ... ?
Id.
147 Participants in a concentrated market anticipate other participants' actions.
6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw 1428, at 174 (1986). "The courts ap-
proach unanimity in saying that mere interdependent parallelism does not estab-
lish contract, combination, or conspiracy required by the Sherman Act § 1." Id.
1433a, at 208-09; see, e.g., Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.,
873 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1989). In Cayman Exploration, the court held that a
plaintiff who attempts to prove the existence of a conspiracy with evidence of
only conscious parallelism must also establish that "the defendants engaged in
consciously parallel action . . .which was contrary to their economic self-interest
so as not to amount to good faith business judgment." Cayman Exploration, 873
F.2d at 1361 (quoting Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 559
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981)).
148 Joint Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 5-6, In re Travel (No. 4-95-107).
149 Id. at 7-8.
150 Id. at 8-9.
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signal the commission caps.15 1 In the alternative, if any state-
ments were made concerning possible commission changes,
they were in response to questions posed to the airlines by travel
agents or the travel agent trade press.1 52 Thus, Delta did not
attempt to signal future commission caps in the public media.
Furthermore, the defendants asserted that public statements
have never been held to justify a finding of conspiracy. For ex-
ample, in United States v. General Motors Corp.,153 the court held
that "the public announcement of a pricing decision cannot be
twisted into an invitation or signal to conspire." Therefore, any
general statement made by air carriers could not satisfy the plus
factor requirement, which elevates conscious parallelism to a po-
tential conspiracy. The airlines claimed that none of their ac-
tions tended to exclude the possibility that they acted
independently. Accordingly, the airlines argued that the plain-
tiffs failed to meet the strict standard required to defeat sum-
mary judgment.
D. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST A STRICTER STANDARD TO DEFEAT
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ANTITRUST
CONSPIRACY CASES
In response to the airlines' assertions, the travel agents argued
that there is not a strict standard of proof required to defeat
summary judgment in antitrust cases, 154 citing the Supreme
Court's decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
Inc. 1 55 as support for this proposition. In Kodak, the plaintiffs,
eighteen independent service organizations (ISOs) filed suit
against Eastman Kodak Company claiming that Kodak adopted
policies to limit the availability of parts used to service its equip-
ment. The ISOs began servicing Kodak copying machines and
micrographic equipment in the early 1980s and alleged that Ko-
dak, by limiting the availability of parts, intended to make it
more difficult for the ISOs to service Kodak machines. The dis-
trict court granted Kodak's motion for summary judgment. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the summary judg-
ment standard in antitrust cases.
151 Id. at 9.
152 Id.
153 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,253, at 97,667 to 97,671 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
154 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the
Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, In re Travel (No. 4-95-107).
155 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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The Court in Kodak discussed the Matsushita decision and spe-
cifically focused on Matsushita's holding that where an alleged
conspiracy is not economically plausible, the plaintiff must in-
troduce evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the
defendants acted independently. 5 6 The Court rejected the
proposition that this language creates a special burden in chal-
lenging a defendant's motion for summary judgment. If a plain-
tiff's economic theory is reasonable, there is no heightened
summary judgment standard according to the Court.157 The
opinion stated:
The Court's requirement in Matsushita that the plaintiffs claims
make economic sense did not introduce a special burden on
plaintiffs facing summary judgment in antitrust cases. The Court
did not hold that if the moving party enunciates any economic
theory supporting its behavior, regardless if its accuracy in re-
flecting the actual market, it is entitled to summary judgment.
Matsushita demands only that the nonmoving party's inferences
be reasonable in order to reach the jury, a requirement that was
not invented, but merely articulated, in that decision. If the
plaintiff's theory is economically senseless, no reasonable jury
could find in its favor, and summary judgment should be
granted. 158
Thus, evidence that creates a reasonable inference of a conspir-
acy will defeat a motion for summary judgment. Must the evi-
dence also tend to exclude the possibility that the defendants
acted independently? The Court did not address the issue of
whether, if the plaintiffs rely solely on circumstantial evidence,
the evidence must tend to exclude independent action.
It should be noted that Kodak did not involve a conspiracy
claim. The primary concern was whether the absence of market
power in the primary photocopier market entailed an absence
of market power in the repair services aftermarket. Therefore,
it is unclear whether the standard articulated in Kodak should be
applied to an antitrust conspiracy case in which only circumstan-
tial evidence is offered. The Kodak decision simply adds to the
confusion surrounding summary judgment in antitrust conspir-
acy cases.
Kodak did not overrule Matsushita, but merely argued that the
"tends to exclude" language does not create a heightened stan-
156 Id. at 468 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88, 595-98).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 468-69 (emphasis added).
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dard.159 In fact, it can be argued that applying a heightened
standard encroaches on the constitutional province of ajury. "A
rule that sifted all evidence through a higher standard, such as
'more likely than not' or 'tends to exclude the possibility' would
effectively require an antitrust plaintiff to survive scrutiny from
the bench first at a standard higher than the jury itself would be
asked to apply. ' 160 Arguably, then, a plaintiffs case that relies
solely on circumstantial evidence which creates a reasonable in-
ference of a conspiracy should be considered by a jury.
Before Kodak, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Co-
ordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litiga-
tion161 held that a conspiracy should not be inferred from
circumstantial evidence if doing so would have an anti-competi-
tive effect. The defendants were major oil companies, which
produced crude oil, refined it into gasoline and sold it to vari-
ous distributors, the bulk of whom were independently
franchised service stations. The oil companies required the
franchise dealers to purchase directly from the franchisor. The
oil companies sold gasoline to each franchise at prices that were
only occasionally changed. As a result of this structure, the
plaintiffs alleged that the oil companies were able to control the
price of gasoline. The oil companies allegedly conspired to
raise and stabilize oil prices by (1) exchanging price and price-
related information, (2) creating an artificial scarcity of crude
oil and refined oil in the western United States, and (3) agree-
ing not to compete in bidding on the plaintiffs annual sale of
petroleum, thus violating sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. 6 2 The district court, however, granted summary judgment
for the defendants.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reviewing the lower
court's decision, considered the Matsushita standard that the
plaintiff must present "sufficiently unambiguous evidence" that
"tends to exclude the possibility" that "the defendants were act-
ing independently."' 6 3 The court hesitated to apply this stan-
dard in instances where inferences of both lawful action and
conspiracy could be drawn, stating:
159 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETI-
TION AND ITS PRACTICE 576 (1994).
1- Id. at 577.
161 906 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Chevron Corp. v. Arizona,
500 U.S. 959 (1991).
162 Id. at 436.
163 Id. at 438 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597).
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We do not take these latter comments as suggesting that a district
court may grant summary judgment to antitrust defendants
whenever the court concludes that inferences of conspiracy and
inferences of innocent conduct are equally plausible. Allowing
the district court to make that decision would lead to a dramatic
judicial encroachment on the province of the jury. To read Mat-
sushita as requiring judges to ask whether the circumstantial evi-
dence is more "consistent" with the defendants' theory than with
the plaintiff s theory would imply that the jury should be permit-
ted to choose an inference of conspiracy only if the judge has
first decided that he would himself draw that inference .... The
Court [in Matsushita] purported to limit the application of the
traditional summary judgment rules in the antitrust context; it
did not intend to abolish them and replace them with an entirely
different set, one which raises troubling seventh amendment
concerns. 164
The court rejected the emphasis placed on circumstantial evi-
dence. Granting summary judgment because the evidence cre-
ates both an inference of conspiracy and an inference of
innocent conduct "would imply that circumstantial evidence
alone would rarely be sufficient to withstand summary judgment
in an antitrust conspiracy case .... Circumstantial evidence is
nearly always evidence that is plausibly consistent with compet-
ing inferences."' 65 The court reasoned that a plaintiff relying
solely on circumstantial evidence would not be able to effectively
challenge actions that could violate antitrust laws. "Since direct
evidence will rarely be available, such a reading [of Matsushita]
would seriously undercut the effectiveness of the antitrust
laws."166
Notwithstanding these concerns, the court recognized the
danger of allowing certain kinds of ambiguous evidence to cre-
ate an inference of conspiracy. 167 In Matsushita, the Supreme
Court feared that allowing an inference of conspiracy from evi-
dence of price cutting could deter competitive conduct because
"cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very
essence of competition."'68 In response to that concern, the Pe-
troleum Products court held that a conspiracy should not be in-
ferred from circumstantial evidence if doing so might have an
164 Id.
165 Id. at 439.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594.
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anti-competitive effect.169  The trial court must determine
whether the protection of independent conduct outweighs the
costs associated with the decrease in the strict application of the
antitrust laws. If so, the plaintiff must present unambiguous evi-
dence that will not have an anti-competitive effect.
The Petroleum Products court thus narrowed the application of
the "tends to exclude" standard. When a plaintiff relies entirely
upon circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy, the court may
grant summary judgment if: (1) the defendant's conduct is con-
sistent with independent action, and (2) permitting an infer-
ence of conspiracy would significantly deter beneficial
procompetitive behavior. Only if these elements are met must a
plaintiff offer evidence that is sufficiently unambiguous and
tends to exclude the possibility that the defendant acted
lawfully.17
0
Furthermore, addressing the issue of circumstantial evidence
versus direct evidence, the court held that because the deter-
rence of competitive behavior could only occur if an inference
of conspiracy was established by circumstantial evidence, "the
Matsushita standards do not apply when the plaintiff has offered
direct evidence of conspiracy.' 17' Therefore, according to Petro-
leum Products, if the plaintiffs have introduced direct evidence of
a conspiracy, the court does not ask whether this evidence tends
to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted indepen-
dently. Accordingly, it is only when a plaintiff relies solely on
ambiguous circumstantial evidence, a court must consider
whether allowing an inference of illegal activity will infringe on
procompetitive activity.
Petruzzi's IGA, discussed previously, also exemplifies the lack of
a clear standard for summary judgment. It is clear that evidence
of conscious parallelism alone will not defeat summary judg-
ment. The court rejected the application of a stricter standard,
stating:
A non-movant's burden in defending against summary judgment
in an antitrust case is no different than in any other case. Rather,
in all cases summary judgment should be granted if, after draw-
ing all reasonable inferences from the underlying facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court concludes
that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved at
169 Petroleum Products, 906 F.2d at 439.
170 Id. at 440.
171 Id. at 441.
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trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.' 7
2
Therefore, circumstantial evidence of conscious parallelism
does not create an inference of illegal activity. But, if the cir-
cumstantial evidence is ambiguous in that it supports both an
inference of conspiracy and an inference of lawful conduct, a
court must be careful that an inference of illegal activity does
not infringe on procompetitve activity.173
Furthermore, the court held that the Matsushita decision did
not authorize summary judgment if both inferences of illegal
conduct and lawful conduct could be shown. In fact, "a nonmov-
ant plaintiff in a section 1 case does not have to submit direct
evidence, i.e., the so-called smoking gun, but can rely solely on
circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn
from such evidence. 174 The court found that, according to Mat-
sushita, "to survive summary judgment in the absence of direct
evidence or strong circumstantial evidence of an agreement, a
plaintiff must assert a theory that is plausible. 175
Since the Kodak decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
in addressing an antitrust conspiracy case, asserted that there is
not a special burden on plaintiffs to defeat summary judg-
ment. 1 76 In Big Apple BMW, the plaintiff claimed that BMW and
some of its dealers conspired to prevent the plaintiffs from at-
taining a BMW franchise and that this action was "pursuant to a
contract, combination or conspiracy with certain BMW dealers
to fix, raise, maintain and stabilize prices of BMW automobiles
in the United States. ' 177 The district court granted summary
judgment on two of the three alleged counts of conspiracy. 171
The Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision.17 9 In
doing so, the court, citing Kodak, asserted that a "non-movant's
burden in defending against summary judgment in an antitrust
case is no different than in any other case. 18'  Thus, all reason-
able inferences must be drawn in a light most favorable to the
172 Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1230 (quoting Big Apple BMW v. BMW of N. Am.,
Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993)).
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1231 (emphasis added).
176 Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358 (3d Cir. 1992).
177 Id. at 1360 (quoting the Plaintiffs Complaint at 34).
17s Id. at 1361.
179 Id. at 1383.
180 Id. at 1363.
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non-movant, and if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmov-
ant, summary judgment should not be granted. 181
Interestingly, however, the court acknowledged that possible
inferences, "when drawn from ambiguous evidence, are circum-
scribed in antitrust cases because a fine line demarcates con-
certed action that violates antitrust law from legitimate business
practices.""8 2 In fact, at trial, an antitrust plaintiff may be re-
quired to show that the alleged concerted action is distinguish-
able from legitimate independent conduct. Therefore, at the
summary judgment stage, a plaintiff, although not required to
"eliminate all possible independent justifications by the manu-
facturer," must introduce evidence that "tends to exclude the
possibility of independent action. 18' 3 Thus, the Third Circuit
opinion suggested two conclusions: (1) a plaintiff, if relying on
ambiguous evidence, must present evidence that tends to ex-
clude the possibility of independent action, and (2) the "tends
to exclude" language does not create a stricter or heightened
standard, but is consistent with the standard enunciated in Celo-
tex. Big Apple BMW, relying on Kodak, highlights the uncertainty
surrounding summary judgment in antitrust conspiracy cases.
If the plaintiff's theory is economically implausible, "a court
must consider whether the plaintiff presented 'sufficiently un-
ambiguous' evidence that the defendants conspired.' ' 8 4 There-
fore, while the court did not exclude the possibility that
circumstantial evidence could defeat summary judgment, it held
that if the evidence is not strong, the theory of conspiracy of-
fered by the plaintiff must be economically plausible and per-
mitting an inference of conspiracy must not chill
procompetitive behavior. Additionally, even though the court
rejected a heightened standard, it said that the inferences drawn
from the evidence must be reasonable and the "focus must re-
main on the evidence proffered by the plaintiff and whether
that evidence 'tends to exclude the possibility that [the defend-
ants] were acting independently."" 8 The court failed to articu-
late a standard, noting instead that a number of factors must be
considered in making a summary judgment determination. Fur-




183 Id. at 1365 (quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 768).
184 Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1233.
185 Id. at 1232 (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764).
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The plaintiffs in the travel agency litigation cited the previ-
ously discussed case law to establish that there is not a height-
ened summary judgment standard in antitrust conspiracy cases.
If the theory of conspiracy is economically plausible, and the
circumstantial evidence creates a reasonable inference of a con-
spiracy, the plaintiffs argued that they were not required to offer
evidence that tended to exclude the possibility that the defend-
ants acted independently.
The plaintiffs offered circumstantial evidence that arguably
created a reasonable inference that the airlines' parallel action
constituted a potential conspiracy. The plaintiffs alleged that:
(1) Delta used the press and other avenues to signal its inten-
tion to cap commissions and to monitor the response of its com-
petitors; (2) the defendant's knew in late January or early
February that Delta was going to announce the commission caps
and then made internal preparations to match the commissions;
(3) the defendant's had numerous telephone contacts, meet-
ings and discussions at "critical" times; (4) the defendants made
repeat internal references to the need for an industry consensus
or industry support with respect to lower commission and distri-
bution costs; (5) the defendants could not have unilaterally im-
posed commission caps given that past failed attempts to do so;
and (6) the plan would not have resulted in an economic bene-
fit for each airline had they all not imposed commission caps. 186
In their memorandum, the plaintiffs stated that there was "sub-
stantial conduct evidence adduced in the case, (and evidenced in
dozens of documents), which shows evidence of their conscious
commitment to a coordinated reduction in base commis-
sions." '187 Thus, the plaintiffs argued, there existed a genuine
issue of material fact to be considered by a jury at trial.
E. THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The court's order denying summary judgment in In re Travel
Agency Commission Antitrust Litigation rejected the view that Mat-
sushita requires the plaintiffs to meet a stricter or heightened
standard of proof to defeat summary judgment.'88 The court
restated the proposition from Kodak that "Matsushita demands
only that the nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable in or-
186 Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment at 10, In re Travel (No. 4-95-107).
1'7 Id. at 11.
1811 In re Travel, 898 F. Supp. at 690.
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der to reach the jury, a requirement that was not invented, but
merely articulated, in that decision.""1 9 The court, however, did
not address the evidence offered by the plaintiffs whether the
plaintiffs' theory of conspiracy was economically plausible, or
whether an inference drawn from circumstantial evidence
would chill procompetitive behavior in the case. The court
acknowledged!
Antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from am-
biguous evidence in a section 1 [Sherman Act] case .... To
survive a motion for summary judgment ... a plaintiff seeking
damages for a violation of section 1 must present evidence that
tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators ac-.
ted independently. '90
Despite this statement, the opinion did not specifically address
whether the evidence was ambiguous or tended to exclude the
possibility of independent action.
The court held that the evidence offered by the plaintiffs per-
mitted an inference of conspiracy. This evidence included a set
of "occurrences, speeches, meetings, events, official and unoffi-
cial corporate utterances, and conferences at which information
was exchanged."' 1 Although circumstantial, the court felt that
the evidence raised an issue of triable fact, and therefore, de-
nied summary judgment. 2 A court may grant summary judg-
ment for the defendants in an antitrust case, the opinion stated,
if the "plaintiffs evidence is insufficient to present a triable case
showing that the accused economic occurrence resulted from
other than independent action."'19
Therefore, the plaintiffs evidence permitted two conclusions:
(1) the defendants reached an explicit agreement to cap com-
missions, or (2) the defendants, following Delta's lead, took ad-
vantage of their oligopsonistic power, and sent messages to each
other indicating that if they acted in concert, they would reap
great economic benefit. Apparently, according to the court, the
evidence introduced by the plaintiffs was credible and sup-
ported a reasonable inference of anticompetitive activity. As a
result, the court denied the summary judgment motion.
189 Id. (quoting Kodak, 504 U.S. at 468).
190 Id. (quoting Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Med. Soc'y, 851 F.2d
1020, 1032 (8th Cir. 1988)).
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F. THE MOVE TowARu DEFINING A STANDARD FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY LITIGATION
Although courts have moved away from their original reluc-
tance to grant summary judgment in antitrust cases, the sum-
mary judgment standard is unclear. It is evident, however, that
courts consider a number of factors in determining whether to
grant summary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case. The
first question, as posed in Matsushita, is whether the theory of
conspiracy is economically plausible. If it is not, according to
the Matsushita decision, the plaintiffs must offer evidence that
tends to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted inde-
pendently. Matsushita leaves open this issue of which standard
applies if the theory of conspiracy is economically plausible.
The courts in Key and Market Force held that if the evidence is
ambiguous (because it creates both an inference of conspiracy
and an inference of lawful activity), the plaintiff must meet the
stricter standard established in Matsushita. In Petroleum Products,
however, the court also considered whether permitting an infer-
ence of conspiracy would pose a significant deterrent to
procompetitive behavior. If these elements are met, the plain-
tiffs must offer evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that
the defendants acted independently.
Antitrust litigation is an expensive undertaking by both sides.
Summary judgment in these cases is desirable if it reduces cost
and spares defendants from unwarranted law suits. Because
courts have held that ambiguous evidence will not establish a
conspiracy, it follows that a plaintiff should be required to intro-
duce additional evidence or else fail to defeat a motion for sum-
maryjudgment. The question remains, what must this evidence
establish? The defendants in the travel agency litigation would
argue that this evidence must tend to exclude the possibility that
the defendants acted independently. The plaintiffs, however,
urge that the evidence need only create a reasonable inference
of a conspiracy, thus creating a triable issue for a jury to con-
sider. Consistent with the plaintiffs' argument, the court in the
travel agency litigation believed that a plaintiff need only pres-
ent a triable issue in order to reach a trial. 94
194 Id. The order states:
The net teaching of Celotex, Liberty Lobby, Matsushita, Eastman Kodak,
and Health Care Equalization, is that summary judgment is to be
granted in favor of defendants in an antitrust case if plaintiffs' evi-
dence is insufficient to present a triable case showing that the ac-
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Antitrust conspiracy claims are often brought against defend-
ants who are members of an oligopoly or oligopsony, such as the
airlines in this case. The theory of oligopolistic interdepen-
dence suggests that in a market where there are few sellers, or
few buyers, a price reduction that results in a substantial expan-
sion of output for one actor will result in such a substantial con-
traction in the output of the other actors and that they will also
respond with a reduction.195 Because a seller knows that such
an action will result in a prompt reaction to his competitors, an
oligopolist will be less likely to reduce prices. 196 Therefore, ac-
tors in an oligopoly are limited by their interdependence with
their competitors.
What happens in the case of an oligopsony, such as the airline
industry, when buyers control the price at which they will pay for
certain goods? In contrast to the case where a seller lowers
prices and receives an immediate expansion in output, the
travel agents argued that controlling the price at which a buyer
purchases a product or service may not have the same effect.
For example, by capping commissions and lowering the cost at
which the airlines pay travel agents for their services, an airline
would actually suffer great losses if not followed by its competi-
tors. In their Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment, the plaintiffs called attention to Exhibit A
in which the defendants apparently recognized that had most of
the actors had not capped commissions, "the commission
change would not 'stick,' and cost savings would not be real-
ized," and that there would have been a great possibility of some
sort of backlash against those who had capped commissions,
even if the reductions were subsequently withdrawn. 97 There-
fore, it is possible that the airlines were using their oligopsonis-
tic power to manipulate travel agency commissions and were not
actually controlled by the appearance of oligopsonistic
interdependence.
cused economic occurrence resulted from other than independent
action. If plaintiffs demonstrate the existence of a triable issue, the
motion for summary judgment must be denied. In this Court's
view, plaintiffs have come forward with sufficient credible evidence
from which reasonable inferences can be drawn to support their
anticompetitive theory.
Id.
195 Posner, supra note 29, at 1564.
196 Id.
197 Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgment at 1 n.1, In re Travel (No. 4-95-107).
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If, however, one believes that actors in an oligopsony are actu-
ally economically interdependent, and therefore unable to
avoid parallel action, then it might be economically reasonable
to require plaintiffs claiming an antitrust conspiracy violation to
introduce evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the
defendants acted independently. In other words, plaintiffs
would be required to present evidence indicating that the de-
fendants actually agreed to take action. And, in fact, the travel
agents may have satisfied that burden by introducing evidence
that the defendants could not have acted independently without
suffering great economic loss.
But the reality is that these complicated considerations simply
contribute to the failure on the part of the courts to articulate
an exact standard for summary judgment in antitrust conspiracy
cases. It is difficult to draw the line between economic reality
and illegal activity. The previous discussion indicates that courts
often struggle with the need to promote procompetitive behav-
ior and yet accept that often a conspiracy can only be shown
with circumstantial evidence that could also support independ-
ent activity on the part of the defendants. A standard that effec-
tively takes into account these competing interests will be
difficult to articulate. Nevertheless, however difficult, the need
to promote procompetitive conduct and defer to the business
judgments of actors in an industry calls for caution in denying
summary judgment in antitrust conspiracy cases.
V. CONCLUSION
In an antitrust conspiracy case, the question should not be
whether there is a strict or heightened standard. Instead, the
focus should be on what type of evidence will create a reason-
able inference of a conspiracy. Arguably, as suggested by much
of the case law, the evidence must tend to exclude the possibility
of independent action. Direct evidence of a conspiracy will
most likely meet this requirement. Only when the evidence is
ambiguous must a plaintiff offer additional evidence. Thus, the
inquiry is evidentiary in nature. No heightened standard is as-
serted or necessary.
The purpose of antitrust conspiracy law is to prevent unfair
manipulation of a given market by a select few within that mar-
ket. Antitrust conspiracy law, however, should not diminish
procompetitive activity or disrupt the natural economic work-
ings of an industry. Antitrust litigation can expose actors to
great expense that may actually hurt the industry in the long
1192
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run. Therefore, plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate
that a reasonable inference of a conspiracy can be drawn from
the evidence. If only indirect ambiguous evidence of a conspir-
acy can be proferred, a plaintiff should also be required to pres-
ent evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the
defendants acted independently.
This requirement ensures that defendants are not subject to
the enormous cost of litigation simply because they are compet-
ing with other actors in the industry. As many courts have
found, mere conscious parallelism is not enough to prove a con-
spiracy. Consequently, parallel action should not defeat a mo-
tion for summary judgment.
What happened in the travel agency litigation? It appears that
although the judge did not apply a "tends to exclude" strict stan-
dard to defeat summary judgment, the outcome would have
been the same. The evidence presented by the plaintiffs indi-
cated that the parallel action taken by the airlines raised an in-
ference of conspiracy. The evidence of meetings and possible
signals did not exclude the possibility of independent action.
But the plaintiffs made a powerful argument that should have
been considered by a jury. Had only one or two of the airlines
capped commissions, those airlines may not have received an
economic benefit. The evidence suggested that, unless all air-
lines followed suit, a commission cap would have been ineffec-
tive, thus tending to exclude the possibility that the defendants
acted independently.
The travel agency litigation posed a serious question: what
must plaintiffs offer to successfully challenge oligopolistic behav-
ior? To illustrate the confusion, consider the following state-
ment recently made by the Supreme Court:
[A]ntitrust law forbids all agreements among competitors
that unreasonably lessen competition among or between them in
virtually any respect whatsoever. Antitrust law also sometimes
permits judges or juries to premise antitrust liability upon little
more than uniform behavior among competitors, preceded by conversa-
tions implying that later uniformity might be desirable.198
Accordingly, conscious parallelism and oligopolistic behavior,
though historically not enough to establish a conspiracy, will be
attacked in the future. The courts have a long way to go to es-
198 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2122 (1996) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
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tablish a clear standard in antitrust conspiracy cases at the sum-
mary judgment stage.
